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Clara Mancini 
Animal-Computer Interaction Lab, Department of Computing and Communications, The Open 
University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom 
C.Mancini@open.ac.uk 
Abstract 
The emerging discipline of Animal-Computer Interaction (ACI) aims to take what in HCI is 
known as a user-centred approach to the design of technology intended for animals, placing 
them at the centre of the design process as stakeholders, users, and design contributors. 
However, current regulatory frameworks for the involvement of animals in research are not 
animal-centred, regarding them as research instruments, unable to consent to procedures that 
may harm them, rather than consenting research participants and design contributors. Such 
frameworks aim to minimise the impacts of research procedures on the welfare of individual 
animals, but this minimisation is subordinated to specific scientific and societal interests, and 
to the integrity of the procedures required to serve those interests. From this standpoint, the 
universally advocated principles of replacement, reduction and refinement aim to address the 
ethical conflicts arising from the assumed inability of individual animals to consent to 
potentially harmful procedures, but such principles in fact reflect a lack of individual centrality.  
This paper makes the case for moving beyond existing regulations and guidelines towards an 
animal-centred framework that can better support the development of ACI as a discipline. 
Firstly, recognising animal welfare as a fundamental requirement for users and research 
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participants alike, the paper articulates the implications of a welfare-centred ethics framework. 
Secondly, recognising consent as an essential requirement of participation, the paper also 
defines criteria for obtaining animals’ mediated and contingent consent to engaging with 
research procedures. Further, the paper argues for the methodological necessity, as well as the 
ethical desirability, of such an animal-centred framework, examining the boundaries of its 
applicability as well as the benefits of its application. Finally, the paper puts forward a series of 
practical principles for conducting ACI research, which imply but also essentially exceed the 
welfare and ethics requirements of current regulatory frameworks. 
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1. Introduction 
We live in a society where computing technology has become ubiquitous and interacting with 
computers no longer means using keyboard and mouse. Embedded in the fabric of our cities, 
workplaces, homes, vehicles, clothes and even bodies, ‘smart’ technologies now allow us to 
relate to the world around us, one another and even ourselves in unprecedented ways [29,54]. 
These achievements have been driven by what interaction designers call user-centred design in 
computing systems, which has shaped the field of Interaction Design (ID) [32].  
Although ID as a discipline has so far focussed on humans as technology users, humans are not 
the only species to engage with interactive systems. Being directly or indirectly involved in 
every aspect of human life and inhabiting increasingly technologised environments, nonhuman 
animals (referred to as animals hereforth) too interact with technology, such as touch-screen 
operant chambers, robotic milking systems, or wearable telemetric devices. However, 
historically the development of animal technology has mostly been driven by disciplines other 
than Interaction Design and efforts to systematically develop user-centred approaches to the 
design of interactive technology for animals are still relatively very recent.  
Consistent with this state of affairs, currently the involvement of animals in the development of 
technology intended for them still falls under the ethical frameworks that regulate their use 
according to national and international legislation (e.g. [14]). Within these frameworks animals 
are essentially viewed as research instruments, unable to understand and consent to procedures 
that may harm them, rather than research participants and design contributors with their own 
interests. The aim of current frameworks is to minimise any negative impact of the research on 
the welfare of the individual animals involved (typically through the implementation of the 
principles of replacement, reduction and refinement [39]); however, this minimisation is 
subordinated to specific scientific interests and to the integrity of the procedures required to 
serve those interests, provided that the interests in question are deemed of sufficient societal 
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significance. This approach is essentially different from that taken by ethical frameworks 
regulating the involvement of humans in research, including within ID [1], where the interests 
of the individual participant are prioritised over the interests of science. In other words, while 
ethics protocols that regulate research aiming to develop technology for humans are essentially 
user-and participant-centred, to date there is no legally established user- and participant-centred 
ethics protocol to regulate the involvement of animals in research aiming to develop 
technology intended for them.  
In ID, user-centred means that an interactive technology is designed ‘around’ its intended users 
in order to best support them in their activities and daily lives. Here the term user is adopted in 
a broader sense and denotes anyone who interacts with a system, an interactor as referred to by 
North [30], whether the interaction is active and intentional [36], active and unintentional [24], 
passive and intentional [13] or passive and unintentional [26]. The established view in ID [32] 
is that, in order to best support users, interactive technology needs to be informed by their 
characteristics, as well as the characteristics of the activities for which it is used, or which it 
enables, and the environment in which said activities take place. It also needs to afford good 
usability (e.g., it should be safe to use, it should be easy to learn how to use, it should help 
users to perform a task efficiently) and user-experience (e.g., it should be motivating and 
stimulating to use). To achieve this, requirements about what a technology should do, and how, 
need to be elicited from those who have a stake in its development (primarily those who will 
use it), in order to inform alternative designs, which then need to be prototyped and evaluated, 
through an iterative process of incremental improvement. To this effect, ID researchers have 
long recognised the importance of involving prospective users in the design process and, since 
the advent of the Participatory Design movement [41], an increasing range of methodological 
approaches aiming to support user involvement have been developed or adopted in ID, 
allowing users to take the role of active research collaborators and design contributors.  
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If Animal-Computer Interaction (ACI) [27,28,34] aims expand the boundaries of Interaction 
Design by developing a user-centred approach to the design of technology intended for 
animals,  then arguably ACI’s ethical approach to research needs to be consistent with this 
fundamental aim, placing animals - as individuals and technology users, legitimate 
stakeholders and design contributors - and their interests at the centre of the design process. 
Such an ethical perspective is not only desirable on the grounds that animals have intrinsic 
value, as acknowledged by international legislation such as the European Constitution [47] and 
Directive on the use of animals in research [14]; an animal-centred ethical perspective is a 
methodological requirement [35] the fulfilment of which is necessary to foster the conditions 
for animal-centred design.  
This paper is composed of two parts. Part 1 introduces ACI and the requirements that its 
proposed aims place on its research outcomes, processes and ethics. Having considered 
frameworks currently regulating the involvement of animals in research, the paper then makes 
the case that ACI’s user-centred and participant-centred approach to interaction design and 
research requires a new, animal-centred framework. The paper discusses the relation of such a 
framework to current principles of best practice in animal research, highlighting the benefits of 
the proposed animal-centred framework for research participants, researchers and ACI as a 
discipline. Part 1 concludes by discussing the role of ACI research and ethics in the real world 
and the space it opens for animals as co-designers of shared futures. Part 2 then articulates a 
series of practical principles grounded in the proposed animal-centred framework.  
PART 1 
2. ACI as an emerging discipline 
Animal technology has existed for a long time, to be found in research laboratories, in modern 
farms or in the field settings of conservation studies. For example, within conservation 
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research, animals have been wearing all kinds of tracking devices since the ‘60s [40]. Since 
more or less the same period, psychologists have been running behavioural experiments 
requiring animals to interact with the interfaces of operant conditioning chambers [12,43]. 
Touch-screen computers allowing great apes to learn and use lexigrams to communicate with 
human researchers have been around since the ‘80s [37,42]; while underwater keyboards for 
dolphins were initially prototyped in the early ‘90s [33]. Roughly at the same time, automatic 
robotic milking systems, which allow dairy cows to choose when to be milked, made their 
appearance [38].  
For a long time, the development of these technologies has mostly been driven by disciplines 
other than Interaction Design (e.g. biology, psychology, engineering), as evidenced by the 
narratives and venues within which these contributions are reported, and - crucially - by the 
fact that the details of the design process are seldom published. With few exceptions [37], in 
these narratives design aspects relative to the devices themselves receive little attention 
compared, for example, to aspects of the research in which the devices are used; therefore, 
although user characteristics are taken into account, it is unclear to what extent the design 
process is informed by the requirements and the participation of the animal users.  
At the turn of the millennium, however, there appears to be a change in the discourse. 
Computer scientists themselves start to take an interest in the design of interactive systems for 
animals and the design process itself begins to receive attention with direct reference to ID 
theories and frameworks [34]. Additionally, researchers attempt to evaluate not merely 
usability aspects (i.e. can the animal use this device at all and how easily can they use it?) but 
also potential user experience aspects (i.e. does the interaction with the device appear to be 
motivating and enjoyable for them?) of technology designed for animals [13,22,36]. 
Researchers also begin to propose methodological and theoretical frameworks to better 
understand, study and explain animal interactions with technology [26,51,52]. In an ACI 
 
7 
Manifesto, Mancini [28] called for a concerted effort towards the systematic development of 
ACI as a discipline around specific aims. The ethics framework proposed in this paper assumes 
these aims, which are therefore reported here in full: 
1) Understanding the interaction between animals and computing technology within the 
contexts in which animals habitually live, are active, and socialize with members of their own 
or other species, including humans. Contexts, activities, and relationships will differ 
considerably between species, and between free living, companion, working, farm, or 
laboratory animals. In each case, the interplay between animal, technology, and contextual 
elements is of interest to the ACI researcher.  
2) Informing the development of interactive technology to:  
i) Improve animals’ life quality or expectancy by facilitating the fulfilment of their 
physiological and psychological needs. Technology that encouraged healthy habits in 
animals or allowed them to modify their housing conditions at leisure might be consistent 
with this aim; similarly, technology that contributed to the refinement of animal farming or 
research procedures reducing their potential harm to the individuals involved might be 
consistent with this aim. 
ii) Support animals in their activities and legal functions in which they are involved, by 
minimizing any negative effects and maximizing any positive effects of those functions on 
the animals’ life expectancy and quality. Technology that gave farm animals control over 
the processes in which they are involved, produced only negligible side effects on the 
animals involved in conservation studies, or made it easier for working animals to perform 
and communicate might be consistent with this aim. 
iii) Foster interspecies relationships (e.g. between humans and other animals) by enabling 
communication and promoting understanding between the two. Technology that allowed 
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animals to play with their humans, or that enabled guardians, carers and researchers to 
understand and respond to the interests and needs of their animals, or that brought animal 
perspectives into the assessment and development of human-animal relations might be 
consistent with this aim.  
3) Developing user-centred approaches to the design of technology intended for animals, 
informed by the best available knowledge of animals’ needs and preferences, to allow them to 
participate in the design process. Consistent with this, ACI appropriately regards animal users 
as legitimate stakeholders and design contributors throughout all the phases of the design 
process and beyond. 
3. Design, methodology and ethical implications in ACI 
Taking a user-centred approach to interaction design has implications on multiple levels. 
Firstly, it has implications for the features to be embedded in the design of an interactive 
product, which need to be informed by the user’s characteristics and requirements, as well as 
those of their activities and of the environments in which they operate. These may include 
systems whose interfaces afford species-specific interaction [20,31,34] or systems that are 
seamlessly integrated in learning and working processes already familiar to the animals 
involved [24,36]; as well as conceptualisations of appropriate forms of interaction [49].  
Secondly, user-centred design has implications for the characteristics of the methodological 
approaches employed during the research and design process, which need to enable users to 
express their requirements through appropriate forms of participation according to their 
characteristics; thus user-centred design is also participant-centred design. To varying degrees, 
many ID methodologies (e.g., questionnaires, interviews) rely on verbal communication or on 
the conceptualizations that natural language underpins, which makes their application to 
designing with animals problematic. Therefore, ACI researchers are working to adapt 
 
9 
participatory methodologies typically used in ID or other relevant disciplines. These may 
include multispecies ethnography [26] or ethology [3] to understand interactions in context and 
elicit design requirements [25], rapid prototyping to develop and test a design [36] or 
preference testing to evaluate user experience [22]; as well as conceptualisations of different 
levels of participation [18]. 
Thirdly, user-centred design has implications for the characteristics of the ethical perspective 
adopted by researchers and designers; this needs to foster the conditions for appropriate forms 
of engagement with users and enable their autonomous involvement in the design process as 
legitimate stakeholders and design contributors. But which criteria would an ACI research 
ethics need to meet in order to best support ACI’s participatory practices? Mancini’s ACI 
Manifesto [28] proposed five ethical principles, which aimed to foster researchers’ respect and 
care for the welfare, interests and autonomy of the animals taking part in ACI research. 
However, such principles were not explicitly grounded in a wider ethical perspective, so their 
articulation appeared arbitrary, albeit sensible. More recently, Väätäjä and Pesonen [50] 
highlighted important concerns when carrying out HCI studies with animals and derived a set 
of ethics guidelines for designing, executing and reporting on such studies, based on their 
review of thirteen existing animal ethics sources. This was the first synthesis of existing 
regulatory frameworks directly relevant to ACI research and, as such, represented an important 
step forward in the development of an animal-centred ethics in interaction design. However, 
this paper makes the case that, from a user-centred perspective, existing regulatory frameworks 
informing animal research present essential limitations; further, the paper attempts to move 
beyond these limitations, articulating an animal-centred ethics that is more consistent with a 
user- and participant-centred perspective.  
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4. Animal ethics in current legislation and protocols 
European legislation, internationally, and British legislation, nationally, establish among the 
highest welfare standards for the involvement of animals in research; these standards are in 
turn reflected in the ethics guidelines of various disciplines and research funding bodies in 
Britain, with comparable examples in other countries. Precisely because they establish such 
comparatively high standards, European and British legislation provide a useful benchmark 
against which to examine the limitations of existing regulatory frameworks from a user- and 
participant-centred perspective. Such limitations will arguably be more significant in 
regulatory frameworks that contemplate lower welfare standards. On the other hand, since the 
framework proposed by this paper implies and exceeds the welfare standards established by 
current regulatory frameworks, it could legally be referred to and applied in any part of the 
world where higher welfare standards were not explicitly prohibited.  
4.1. International legislation: Europe 
The European Directive (2010/63/EU) “On the Protection of Animals Used for Scientific 
Purposes” [14] applies to scientific “procedures” which imply “any use, invasive or non-
invasive, of an animal for experimental or other scientific purposes, with known or unknown 
outcome, or educational purposes, which may cause the animal a level of pain, suffering, 
distress or lasting harm equivalent to, or higher than, that caused by the introduction of a 
needle in accordance with good veterinary practice” (art. 3). The Directive recognises animal 
welfare as “a value of the Union enshrined in Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TEFU) [47]” (par. 2). It also recognises that “new scientific knowledge is 
available in respect of factors influencing animal welfare as well as the capacity of animals to 
sense and express pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm” and that “it is therefore necessary 
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to improve the welfare of animals used in scientific procedures by raising the minimum 
standards for their protection in line with the latest scientific developments” (par. 6). On these 
grounds, “in addition to [non-human (art. 1)] vertebrates including cyclostomes, cephalopods” 
(par. 8 and art. 1) and “foetal forms of mammals in the last third of their development period” 
(par. 9 and art. 1) are protected under the Directive, due to their potential to experience pain, 
suffering, distress and lasting harm. 
The obligation to treat animals “as sentient creatures” and restrict their use to “areas which 
may ultimately benefit human or animal health, or the environment” (par. 12 and art. 5) is 
motivated by the recognition that “animals have an intrinsic value which must be respected” 
and by the “ethical concerns of the general public as regards the use of animals in procedures” 
(par. 12). Thus animals who are closer to humans from an evolutionary perspective (e.g. non-
human primates, particularly great apes) or from a social perspective (e.g. companion species 
such as cats and dogs) are warranted special consideration (par. 18, 21, 33). Where their 
welfare is not compromised by having undergone procedures, the directive indicates that 
“animals such as dogs and cats should be allowed to be rehomed in families as there is a high 
level of public concern as to the fate of such animals” (par. 26).  
The Directive further prescribes that “the care and use of live animals for scientific purposes is 
governed by the internationally established principles of replacement [e.g. of animals with 
non-animal methods, of one species with a less sentient species], reduction [in the number of 
animals used, including the reuse of the same animals in more than one procedure (par.25)] and 
refinement [of procedures, in order to minimise their impact]” (par. 11 and art. 4) [39]. The 
development of alternative methods, which do not involve animals, is encouraged by the 
Directive (par. 10, 46, 47). Where animals are used, the Directive prescribes that “animal 
welfare considerations should be given the highest priority in the context of animal keeping, 
breeding and use” (par. 31) and that the killing of animals at the end of a procedure should be 
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carried out “by a competent person, using a method that is appropriate to the species” to 
minimise “pain, distress and suffering to the animal” (par. 15). The Directive furthermore 
prescribes that it is “essential, both on moral and scientific ground, to ensure that each use of 
an animal is carefully evaluated as to the scientific and educational validity, usefulness and 
relevance of the expected results of that use” and that “the likely harm to the animal should be 
balanced against the expected benefits of the project” (par. 39), where benefits could relate to 
human health, the health of other animals or the environment. The Directive details minimum 
requirements for the sourcing, accommodation and care of animals used in procedures to 
ensure acceptable welfare standards (section 1 of chapter IV and annex III). It also requires 
national animal ethical review bodies to assess research proposals and ensure compliance with 
legal welfare requirements, and establishes criteria for increasing transparency in the use of 
animals for research purposes (art. 26-27). 
4.2. National regulations: the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Animal (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA) Amendment 
Regulations 2012 [5] differ from the Directive in relatively minor ways. For example, the 
definition of “regulated procedure” (section 4) and the purposes for which procedures are 
allowed (section 5) are the same. Similarly, protected animals are also vertebrates, although 
protection could be extended to invertebrates, should evidence of sentience emerge. There is 
the same strong emphasis on the implementation of the principles of replacement, reduction 
and refinement (section 5), and on care standards (e.g. section 14 and 17). Likewise, there is a 
provision for setting free or rehoming animals under specific conditions (section 18) and, when 
setting free or rehoming is not permitted, the killing of animals at the end of procedures is also 
tightly regulated (section 15). Procedures which are regulated under the ASPA and 
Amendment Regulations 2012 have to be licenced by the Secretary of State, following a cost-
benefit analysis. 
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Research which involves animals but is not covered by the ASPA and Amendment Regulations 
2012 might fall under other legislation. In particular, research involving British wildlife or 
studies in the countryside is covered by the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 [7]. The Act 
protects wild birds during mating and breeding season (section 1), and a selection of other 
species of wild animals all year round (section 9). The Act specifically prohibits the 
unauthorised “intentional killing, injuring or taking of the animals; the taking, damaging, 
destroying of or obstructing access to nests or places used for shelter or protection while in use, 
or the disturbance of animals occupying such places” (section 1). The Act also prohibits the 
unauthorised “taking or destroying of eggs; and possession or control of protected animals” 
(whether live or dead) and their sale (whether as a whole or parts). It additionally regulates the 
lawful killing of wild animals by prohibiting certain methods (section 5 and 11), and it 
prescribes minimum standards for the lawful keeping of captive birds, except poultry (section 
8). As with procedures regulated by the ASPA and Amendment Regulations, all scientific 
procedures which entail prohibited activities also require a licence from the Secretary of State. 
Research which does not require a Secretary of State’s licence still falls under the legislature of 
the Animal Welfare Act 2006 [6]. While the Act 2006 is not specifically intended to regulate 
research procedures, it provides an indication of a minimum standard of care to be observed for 
non-regulated practices. The Act protects domesticated and managed (section 2) non-human 
vertebrate animals (and possibly invertebrate animals, where scientific evidence has 
demonstrated their sentience) (section 1). Under the Act, no one is allowed to cause an animal 
to suffer “unnecessarily” (section 4). Here suffering is considered unnecessary unless: it cannot 
reasonably be avoided or reduced; it results from conduct which aims to implement a licence or 
code of practice issued under an enactment (e.g. a cull or regulated procedure); it results from 
conduct whose legitimate purpose is to benefit the animal or protect a person, property or other 
animal, and the conduct is proportionate to achieving its purpose by a reasonably competent 
and humane person. Additionally, under the Act those who own or are in charge of (and have 
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in their care) an animal are responsible for their welfare (section 3) and must take reasonable 
steps in all circumstances to ensure that the needs of the animal are met to the extent required 
by good practice. Such needs include: a suitable environment to live; a suitable diet; being able 
to exhibit normal behaviour patterns; being housed with, or apart from, other animals as 
appropriate; being protected from pain, suffering, injury and disease (section 9). However, “the 
destruction of an animal in an appropriate and humane manner” is excluded by the 
considerations the Act makes in relation to their suffering or to the fulfilment of their needs 
(section 4 and 9).  
4.3. Derived research ethics protocols and guidelines 
Research ethics protocols across research associations and funding bodies in turn reflect 
national regulations regarding the use of animals in research and animal welfare more 
generally. In the UK - in collaboration with the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council (BBSRC), the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), 
the Medical Research Council (MRC), the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) 
and the Wellcome Trust - the National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction 
of Animals in Research (NC3Rs) produced guidelines detailing researchers’ responsibilities in 
the use of animals in bioscience [10]. This is directly informed by the ASPA (and Amendment 
Regulations), as well as the Wildlife and Countryside Act and Animal Welfare Act, with 
emphasis on the implementation of the principles of replacement, reduction and refinement, the 
careful consideration of costs to animal welfare in relation to scientific benefits, and welfare 
standards regarding the sourcing, transportation, housing, husbandry, care and killing of the 
animals being used. Similar requirements for the use of animals in research can be found in the 
ethics guidelines of national and international scientific associations, such as the British 
Psychological Society [11], the Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour [2], or the 
International Society for Applied Ethology [19]. Additionally, these guidelines invite more 
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extensive protections for the animals involved, for example, by considering both vertebrates 
and invertebrates on the grounds of their potential sentience, and by encouraging researchers to 
design procedures that entail non-aversive stimuli and offer the animal the opportunity to 
withdraw from a procedure, compatibly with the aims of the research.  
5. Limitations of existing frameworks 
Although these protocols and guidelines represent the state-of-the-art with regards to the 
protection of animals involved in research, some of their underlying assumptions are 
inconsistent with ACI’s proposed user- and participant-centred perspective. As discussed, in 
existing legal frameworks only species who possess specific physiological characteristics (e.g. 
a spinal cord) or specific psychological characteristics (e.g. sentience) are protected under 
those frameworks. This has the implication that, for animals who do not possess those 
characteristics or in whom those characteristics are more difficult to measure, the grounds for 
protection are weaker or lacking altogether. Moreover, independently of their physiological 
and psychological characteristics, animals are not protected solely on the grounds of their 
intrinsic value but also on the grounds of their societal value, which means that species who 
happen to be regarded as companions rather than food (e.g. dogs vs pigs in Western cultures) 
are granted higher protection regardless of their welfare requirements. Overall, the strong focus 
on category-based distinctions (e.g. dogs vs mice, stray vs bred) to be found in these 
frameworks does not account for individual differences (and related requirements) beyond such 
categorisations.  
Animals involved in research are effectively regarded as instruments in the experimental 
apparatus, albeit instruments who need to be treated with careful consideration, rather than as 
participants in the research process. In the regulations, protocols and guidelines discussed 
above, such a perspective is signalled in a number of ways. For one thing, regulated research 
does not have to be relevant to the animals involved (e.g. an animal might be used as a model 
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for investigating a disease or cognition in, or test drugs for, a different species). Furthermore, 
although the use of animals in research procedures has to be approved by a competent authority 
following a cost-benefit analysis, any envisaged benefits need not be to the advantage of the 
individuals involved or even to members of their species, and any costs to the individuals 
involved may be deemed acceptable if the expected benefits to society are deemed to warrant 
such costs. From this perspective, while all regulations, protocols and guidelines prescribe 
minimisation of any suffering and harm, such minimisation is subordinated to the aims of the 
research (e.g. the avoidance of death as the end point of a procedure or the use of anaesthesia 
for a procedure that could cause the animal to suffer are recommended, but that is provided 
compatibility with the purpose of the procedure). Along the same lines, although some 
protocols consider allowing the animals involved the possibility to withdraw from a procedure 
where possible, this possibility is again subordinated to the aims of the research; mostly, 
existing frameworks make no explicit provision for enabling animals to consent, or dissent, to 
their involvement. Finally, although researchers are encouraged to make alternative 
arrangements wherever possible, the killing of animals at the end of procedures is generally 
permissible and still treated as a matter of course provided the method of killing is deemed 
humane; this is the case not only for humane reasons, when the welfare of animals used in a 
procedure is irretrievably compromised as a result, but also for logistical reasons, when at the 
end of a procedure the animals involved are no longer needed and therefore become surplus to 
requirement.  
Within this landscape, the principles of replacement, reduction and refinement are generally 
advocated as best practice, in order to achieve the best possible compromise between animal 
welfare requirements and research interests. However, while aiming to limit the impact of 
research practices on the individuals involved, such principles and the mode of their 
implementation in fact reflect a lack of individual perspective. For example, the principle of 
replacement reinforces the assumption that animals are substitutable components of an 
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experimental set-up. The fact that the reuse of an animal, albeit strongly regulated, is 
considered a viable solution for implementing the principle of reduction is also symptomatic of 
a perspective in which animals and their subjective experience (whatever this might be) are 
regarded as the abstract-able, add-able, subtract-able, interchange-able quantities of an 
experimental equation.  
Of course, this is not to say that the principles of replacement, reduction and refinement bear 
no relevance to ACI research, nor that in practice ACI research is always completely different 
from any other research involving animals, nor that cost-benefit considerations or procedural 
integrity are not important in ACI research. Rather it is a matter of perspective: arguably, in 
user- and participant-centred research, considerations of cost-benefit, procedural integrity, 
consent and engagement should pivot around the characteristics and requirements of the 
animals involved, which implies a change of focus with respect to the regulations, protocols 
and guidelines discussed above. This does not mean that said regulations, protocols and 
guidelines are no longer important, but simply that for the purposes of ACI research they are 
inadequate, because they assume a perspective whereby the characteristics and requirements of 
the animals involved are not pivotal; in other words, current regulations, protocols and 
guidelines are not animal-centred. On the other hand, a reframing of animal research from an 
animal-centred perspective could not only better support ACI researchers and practitioners; it 
could also better support researcher and practitioners who work with animals in other fields 
and whose research would benefit from being consistent with such a perspective (e.g., certain 
ethological studies). 
6. Ethical implications of user- and participant-centred design for and with animals 
This paper argues that, in order to be consistent with a user- and participant-centred 
perspective, ACI’s ethical approach to research needs to be informed by different criteria. 
Firstly, it is not the animal characteristics that provide grounds for their treatment but rather 
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their role as users and research participants. Thus, giving all animals involved in ACI research 
equal protection and care (according to their individual needs) is the most appropriate way to 
ensure that their requirements as users can emerge during the process and can therefore be 
designed for with their active participation. On the other hand, precisely because user 
characteristics are so central to the design process, animals cannot be viewed as the 
substitutable components of an experimental set-up. Therefore, it is only appropriate to involve 
an animal in research if this is directly relevant to them. Furthermore, Väätäjä proposes animal 
welfare as a specific design goal [49]; indeed, if one recognises that maintaining good welfare 
at all times is an important individual requirement, in order to be consistent with user- and 
participant-centred design ACI research needs to be compatible with the welfare of both end 
users and research participants. As discussed above, protecting the welfare of animals used in 
research is the aim of related institutional directives, protocols and guidelines. But what are the 
specific implications of ACI’s animal-centred perspective in this regard?  
6.1. A welfare-centred ethics 
What constitutes good welfare for animals is the object of on-going research [15,16], some 
notions of animal welfare assuming more than others that animals are capable of conscious and 
sentient experience. Because it bypasses the issue of consciousness and sentience, and is 
therefore relevant to all animals, the notion of welfare proposed by Stamp Dawkins [44,45,46] 
is particularly useful here. For Stamp Dawkins animal welfare presupposes the fulfilment of 
two fundamental conditions: that an animal is healthy and that they have what they want. The 
author’s rationale is that animals have evolved adaptations for coping with environmental 
conditions (e.g. a thick coat), for exploiting available resources (e.g. specific hunting 
techniques or a specialised digestive system) and for recovering from injury (e.g. mounting an 
immune response), in order to maintain good health thus maximising their chances of survival 
and reproduction. However, Stamp Dawkins points out, animals have also evolved adaptations 
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for preventing the occurrence of conditions that could compromise their survival in the first 
place, adaptations which result in the animals wanting certain things: for example, wanting to 
search for prey that might be hiding in the ground, or wanting to burrow to hide from potential 
predators. For Stamp Dawkins, the animal being healthy and having what they want are 
interdependent conditions or, as interaction designers would say, requirements (e.g. a captive 
animal whose exploratory drive is constantly frustrated may develop harmful compulsive 
behaviours), which need to be satisfied at the same time (e.g. giving an animal free access to 
food needs to be compatible with maintaining their optimal weight). If only one of the two 
conditions is satisfied, welfare is compromised.  
It follows that ACI research should never threaten the health of the animals involved and never 
deny them what they want, unless denying or limiting what they want is necessary to preserve 
their health. More specifically, the welfare requirement that an animal is healthy means that 
ACI research should never entail practices or procedures which interfere with the evolutionary 
adaptations that support the animal’s health (e.g. through genetic manipulations), or threaten 
the animal’s health by compromising their physiological or psychological integrity (e.g. 
through invasive, aversive or otherwise injurious manipulations). On the other hand, the 
welfare requirement that an animal has what they want means that ACI research practices or 
procedures should never prevent an animal from expressing spontaneous behaviour (e.g. 
through restriction or constriction), or entail the confinement of an animal within settings 
which are not those for which they have evolved (e.g. through caging). The only cases in which 
ACI research would be connected to (without requiring or instigating) such practices or 
procedures would be if these already occurred in the context where the research took place 
(e.g. if the research took place on a farm where confinement was part of husbandry practices, 
or if the research took place in a veterinary clinic where movement restriction was part of 
therapeutic procedures).  
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Stamp Dawkins [44] notes how generally the death of an animal is not in itself considered a 
welfare issue on the grounds that a dead animal cannot suffer, from which would follow that 
the killing of an animal upon completion of a research procedure, an accepted practice by 
current legislation, does not impact on their welfare unless it causes the animal to suffer in the 
process. However, such a position seems to be at odds with the very evolutionary definition of 
animal welfare. If an animal has evolved certain adaptations precisely because these allow 
them to stay alive, and if violations to the animal’s adaptations impact on their welfare, then 
interventions that lead to the animal’s death arguably pose a welfare issue on the grounds that 
such interventions are incompatible with the very function that has allowed those adaptations to 
evolve (if not with their very purpose). Bekoff [4] argues how the struggle of an animal who is 
under attack indicates that his life matters to him; this point is arguably valid whether the 
animal is or not aware of the attack, or even whether he is or not aware of being alive. As 
Stamp Dawkins [39] points out, struggling (e.g. to break free from confinement) is an 
evolutionary adaptation ultimately aimed at keeping the animal alive and well. Whether the 
threat to an animal’s life is delivered overtly in a form that the animal is able to recognise as a 
threat (e.g. strangulation) and thus respond to (e.g. struggling), or covertly in a form that the 
animal is unable to recognise (e.g. lethal injection during sedation) and thus respond to (e.g. 
hiding), the fact remains that such a threat opposes the very function of the animal’s life-
preserving adaptations. In this respect, it could be argued that killing can never be compatible 
with animal welfare, except when the very mechanisms whose function is to keep the animal 
alive and well are so irretrievably compromised (e.g. because of illness) that there is no hope 
for the animal’s health and contentment to be restored to balance. Thus, on welfare grounds, 
the killing of participating animals at the end of research procedures is incompatible with 
ACI’s animal-centred perspective. 
Instead, consistent with Stamp Dawkins’ definition of welfare [44], researchers should always 
endeavour to respect the animal’s identity and safeguard their integrity, both physiological and 
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psychological, at all times. This means that researchers should work in contexts that are 
habitual for and thus familiar to the animal; they should endeavour to be as unobtrusive and 
undisruptive of the animal’s daily life patterns and routines as possible; they should give the 
animal space for expression and control over the research process; and they should use only 
forms of interaction which are respectful of and responsive to the animal’s needs and wants at 
all times. In animal-centred research, the interests of individual participants should “prevail 
over the interests of science and society, where there is conflict” [9] and any potential risks to 
individual participants should outweigh any potential benefits to others. Therefore any cost-
benefit analysis of the research should be carried out from the perspective of what, at the best 
of the researchers’ knowledge, are the animal’s best interests. In user-centred design this is 
both an ethical imperative, as recognised by ethics frameworks regulating the involvement of 
humans in HCI research [1], and a methodological necessity, as argued by Ritvo and Allison in 
their discussion of research methodologies applicable to ACI [35]. But how can researchers 
ensure that, in the case of animals, the interests and requirements of users and research 
participants are appropriately represented and thus prioritised? 
6.2. The issue of consent 
Existing frameworks motivate the need to minimise the impact of research procedures on the 
welfare of the animals involved, on the grounds that animals are capable of suffering whilst 
being incapable of consenting. Consenting implies the ability to comprehend the immediate 
and wider implications of one’s involvement [15], but of course interspecies cognitive 
differences and communication barriers make conveying the welfare implications of a research 
procedure to other animals very challenging if not practically impossible. Nevertheless, 
consent arguably marks an important difference between subjection and participation, thus in 
user-centred research the animals’ consent needs to somehow be sought.  
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Of course, one approach to the issue is seeking consent for animals via mediators who are 
capable of comprehending the implications of the research in relation to the animals’ welfare 
requirements, and who have the legal authority to consent on their behalf. To ensure that 
consent is provided from a user- and participant-centred perspective, such agents should also 
have a vested interest in prioritising the welfare of the animals concerned. Furthermore, since 
in user-centred research participants are not merely representatives of a category or 
substitutable components of an experimental apparatus but individuals, consent should to be 
sought on an individual basis. In this regard, Mancini et al. [26] highlighted the complementary 
role of the animals’ daily carers, on the one hand, and animal welfare experts, on the other 
hand: the former hold critical contextual knowledge about an individual’s characteristic 
patterns and circumstances, while the latter hold essential expertise to assess those 
characteristic patterns and circumstances in relation to established animal welfare knowledge 
[50]. Thus, overall mediated consent should imply the following: 1) the capacity to 
comprehend the immediate and wider welfare implications of a procedure, 2) a vested interest 
in prioritising the welfare of individual animals 3) familiarity with the individual’s 
characteristic patterns and circumstances, 4) animal welfare expertise relevant to the 
individual, 5) the legal authority to consent on behalf of the animal. Whether all or part of these 
competences are distributed across different individuals (e.g. the animal’s human companion 
who is also their legal guardian and an independent animal welfare expert) or are found within 
one individual (e.g. if the human companion and legal guardian is also an animal welfare 
expert), they should all be represented in the consenting process. Additionally, an independent 
authority, such as the animal welfare review bodies envisaged by the European Directive, 
should ensure that the above conditions are met in compliance with ACI’s research ethics 
framework as well as existing legislation. 
On the other hand, voluntary engagement is a fundamental aspect of consent [15]; however, 
clearly it would not be realistic to assume that mediators know what the animal they represent 
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wants in specific contingencies. Thus mediation does not eliminate the need to obtain some 
form of contingent consent from the animals themselves. While animals might not be able to 
assess the welfare or wider implications of a procedure, they are nevertheless able to respond to 
specific conditions [44], provided they are afforded the freedom to make relevant choices, 
including the choice not to engage or withdraw altogether. Ritvo and Allison [35] propose that 
participant-controlled procedures are best suited to enable animals’ preferences to emerge in 
ACI research; these may entail dichotomous-choice protocols, whereby participants choose 
whether or not to be exposed to a stimulus, or multi-stimulus protocols, whereby participants 
can choose between different stimuli as well as the length of stimulus exposure. If a participant 
is enabled to choose the pace and modality of their engagement with, or withdrawal from, the 
research process at any time, then their response can provide a measure of their consent to 
engaging with a specific research set-up. Of course, any contextual variations during a 
procedure might affect the participant’s assessment of the situation and thus their amenability 
to participate, so whether participants are able to assess the situation is an important 
consideration.  
Luger and Rodden [23] argue that, as ubiquitous computing systems become more complex 
and seamless, and support an increasing range of daily activities, the data that drives their 
functionalities is increasingly abstracted from its original context; this makes it impossible for 
(human) users to understand the implications of their interactions with such systems and thus 
provide informed consent to the use of data they divulge during the course of those 
interactions. In this respect, the authors emphasise the dynamic nature of consent and the 
importance of enabling effective withdrawal at any time; they also stress the importance of 
giving users visibility over data flows within systems and the ability to easily interrogate the 
system to evaluate the cost-benefit trade-offs of engaging or withdrawing. In a more concrete 
sense, these are similarly useful considerations when designing ACI research procedures. Thus, 
overall contingent consent should imply the following: 1) procedural set-ups that enable the 
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animal to assess the situation as much as possible (e.g. allowing the animal to freely explore 
their surroundings or any research equipment as appropriate prior to starting a procedure, and 
at regular intervals during the procedure), 2) opportunities for the animal to make relevant 
choices between alternative forms of engagement (e.g. between different forms of input or 
output in an interface; between reward mechanisms based on food or play), 3) the possibility 
for the animal to effectively withdraw or withhold engagement (e.g. plenty of escape routes or 
comfortable rest areas as appropriate). Importantly, in order to monitor levels of consent over 
time, researchers should be able to continually and expertly monitor variations in the 
participant’s response to a procedure against their welfare requirements, as highlighted by 
Väätäjä and Pesonen [50], and dynamically and promptly make any appropriate adjustments, 
including suspending a procedure. 
Researchers who work with non-competent or non-linguistic humans [8,9] are well familiar 
with notions of mediated and contingent consent, its dynamic and transient nature (e.g. consent 
as a process rather than as a one-off occurrence [9]), and the critical importance of monitoring 
and responding to signs of dissent (e.g. a young child becoming upset [9]). They are also aware 
of the necessary complementarity of the two forms of consent [8,9], whereby those who can 
see the wider implications of a participant’s involvement lend their insight in the participant’s 
best interest, while the participant themselves is the only one who can assess the contingent, 
directly experiential implications. Consistent with the implications of user- and participant-
centred research, the very ethical perspective underpinning these notions is just as relevant 
here. But how does such a perspective relate to the universally advocated principles of 
replacement, reduction and refinement [37]? 
7. ACI’s research ethics and the 3Rs 
As discussed earlier, in bioscience the implementation of the principles of refinement, 
reduction and replacement, commonly known as the 3Rs [39], has become an important 
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requirement to address the ethical conflict between the fact that animals cannot consent to their 
involvement in potentially harmful research procedures and the fact that human society 
considers their use in such procedures necessary to achieve a greater good. Indeed, ACI’s user-
centred and participant-centred research has the potential to significantly contribute to the 
implementation of the 3Rs in bioscience: through ACI’s research outcomes, which could 
produce knowledge and technology enabling the refinement of future research procedures; and 
through ACI’s methodological approach, which pushes researchers to develop refined 
procedures in the first place on ethical and scientific grounds.  
On the other hand, for the reasons discussed above, the 3Rs reflect an ethics perspective that, 
albeit animal-welfare-minded, is not animal-welfare-centred, as demonstrated by the fact that 
research that does cause harm to the animals involved can still be carried out under the 
auspices of the 3Rs, provided the expected outcomes are deemed important enough for society. 
Therefore, the relation of ACI research practices to the 3Rs is somewhat more complex than it 
might be in other bioscience domains. Like any other research involving animals, ACI research 
should endeavour to refine its procedures for both ethical and scientific reasons. This includes 
the need to protect animals from poor research designs and meaningless procedures, where the 
meaning of a procedure should be primarily assessed with respect to the interests of the 
animals involved. Although procedures that imply more than negligible risks for the 
participants are in principle incompatible with ACI’s aims in the first place, where non-risky 
procedures are deemed meaningful (i.e. relevant and potentially beneficial for the animals 
involved), refinement can ensure that even unforeseeable risks are reduced while increasing the 
viability of any data obtained and the success of any design. Of course, refinement pertains 
both to the design and execution of research procedures, and to their proper and accurate 
documentation and publication, so that procedures do not need to be unnecessarily repeated 
and findings can be reliably built upon by the research community [50]. 
 
26 
Similarly to other research involving animals, ACI research should consider the 
appropriateness of reducing the number of individual animals involved. However, when 
deciding on numbers, consideration should be given to the fact that statistical power (the main 
criterion commonly used for reduction) is not the only important factor. In ACI research, 
animals’ involvement is valuable not only for their general characteristics as representatives of 
a category, but also for their individual characteristics [36], which can produce important 
insights. This aspect should be considered in light of the fundamental conditions that the 
interests of individual participants are always prioritised, and their involvement is fully 
justified and authorised by a competent scientific and ethical review body. 
Similarly to other research involving animals, ACI research should aim to replace them 
whenever possible. However, as discussed above, in ACI animals should not be seen as the 
substitutable components of an experimental set-up. Precisely because animals cannot provide 
informed consent to taking part in research procedures, it is important that researchers work 
with individual animals only if the intent is to advance knowledge or develop technology that 
is directly beneficial or otherwise relevant to those individuals. Therefore, replacing one 
species with another species (even a less sentient one) is not appropriate, unless the individuals 
of the species involved as a replacement have themselves a stake in the research process. For 
example, if researchers were to work with mice to develop an interface designed to help 
assistance dogs carry out certain tasks around the house of their assisted humans, they would 
do a disservice both to the mice (who would be involved in a process in which they have no 
stake) and to the dogs (who would find themselves having to use a product that was not 
designed for them). Indeed, researchers ought to be able to work not just with any dogs, but 
specifically with the end users of the interface being designed, that is the assistant dogs for 
whom the interface was being developed (who do have a stake in the process and who, as 
individuals, would directly benefit from the research). 
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However, at least for parts of the research or development process, replacing the target species 
with methods that do not involve animals or that involve consenting competent humans is 
desirable. In ID, research procedures do not necessarily involve end users at all times: for 
limited parts of the development process, researchers apply heuristics, execute technical 
tests or themselves take part in preliminary testing to ensure that a prototype is the best it can 
be before it is proposed to the users for evaluation [36]. Similarly, in ACI, researchers could 
apply heuristics, execute technical tests or involve consenting competent humans in 
preliminary testing before evaluating a prototype with their target users. Indeed, research 
methodologies could be developed to allow human participants to take part in requirements 
elicitation or preliminary evaluation activities on behalf of animal users. However, it is 
important to note that researchers cannot expect to altogether replace their animal users with 
humans or machines and still produce technology that is user-centred, because their target 
users are neither humans nor machines. Users have unique characteristics, interests and 
requirements that researchers need to understand and design for, to do which they need their 
users to be part of the process at least at key points if not throughout. As with reduction, the 
issue of replacement should be considered in light of the fundamental conditions that the 
interests of individual participants are always prioritised, and their involvement is fully 
justified and authorised by a competent scientific and ethical review body. 
8. Benefits of ACI’s research ethics protocol 
As we have seen, while a wealth of frameworks exist which cover the involvement of animals 
in research, the ethical assumptions informing such frameworks fall short of the standards 
required for consistency with ACI’s user- and participant-centred perspective. Arguably, an 
animal-welfare-centred framework which is more consistent with such a perspective, and 
which can appropriately inform ACI research practices, can therefore better support ACI 
researchers in their work and the development of ACI as a discipline, while protecting the 
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animals participating in the research. Such support might equally relate to the design, execution 
and evaluation of research procedures [47] (research processes), to the conception, 
development and deployment of interactive technologies (research outcomes), or to the public 
demonstration of both research processes and outcomes during peer or public engagement 
activities. Arguably, at a time when ACI research projects are increasing in numbers and scope 
worldwide, and are making an appearance at scientific and other public events (e.g. 
conferences, workshops, exhibitions), an animal-centred ethics framework can not only serve 
as a benchmark for ACI research practices involving animals either in the lab or in the wild, 
but also more generally as a vehicle for fostering a research culture of mindfulness and respect 
of the needs and requirements of (human and other-than-human) animal research participants.  
On the other hand, while primarily aiming to protect animal participants, the ACI research 
ethics framework proposed here also aims to protect the researchers who work with them. The 
use of animals in research can elicit strong responses in favour (e.g. [48]) or against (e.g. [53]) 
as to its ethical acceptability. Indeed, the ethical dilemma posed by animal research is at the 
base of on-going efforts to replace, reduce and refine animal use in scientific procedures (e.g. 
[14]). Consistent with such a dilemma, it is likely that the position of ACI researchers will vary 
across the spectrum and that some ACI researchers will be uncomfortable with the idea of 
using, or being perceived as using, animals in scientific procedures that are potentially harmful 
to or demeaning of them. For these researchers it may be more agreeable to engage in ACI 
research if their activities can be explicitly referred to an ethics framework that grants the 
highest degree of protection to the animals they wish to work with. Such researchers are 
entitled to the reassurance that may derive from the awareness that they are operating under the 
banner of such a framework, which in turn may enable them to work more effectively. 
Similarly, the proposed ACI research ethics framework aims to reassure and protect the general 
public, by creating the conditions for ACI research to be conducted with full transparency, thus 
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remaining open to public scrutiny, consistent with recent regulatory trends, but not necessarily 
current practice in other domains [14]. On the other hand, enabling ACI researchers to discuss 
their work openly without fear of repercussions is important to ensure that members of the 
public have no reason to speculate and draw misinformed conclusions about such research. 
Exposure of ACI research is additionally important to the fulfilment of ACI aims, which 
include fostering better relationships between humans and animals through promoting better 
understanding between parties. In this respect, public engagement with ACI research (e.g. by 
enabling members of the public to participate in research activities with their companion 
animals) has a key role to play. 
9. ACI research and ethics in the real world 
Since ACI’s animal-welfare-centred ethics differs in perspective from the perspective of 
existing ethical frameworks regulating the involvement of animals in research and other human 
practices (e.g. farming), one might question whether it is appropriate for ACI researchers to 
ever engage with systems whose very functioning is only possible because animal welfare is 
not the central value. The way in which ACI researchers negotiate the ethical boundaries 
between their research and the systems in which their research might take place (e.g. farms, 
laboratories, zoos) is likely to depend on their knowledge and value system. As an extreme 
example, some ACI researchers might be willing to design digitally enhanced slaughterhouses 
to reduce farm animals’ suffering at the time of slaughter, while others might not be willing to 
design technology whose very purpose is to kill animals.  
Similarly, there are ethical boundaries to be negotiated between the interests of the animals 
involved in ACI research and the interests of anyone who might be affected by or as a result of 
the research. While from a user- and participant-centred perspective the interests of the animals 
involved in the research are of pivotal importance, the interests of other stakeholders also need 
to be considered. For example, an ambient interactive system that enabled tigers to find and 
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catch deer more efficiently as a way of supporting the survival of the species in the wild would 
raise a range of ethical issues, as it would cause suffering and death to other animals and 
potentially alter a delicate balance in the ecosystem. Some ACI researchers might feel that this 
would be justified to help an endangered species, while some would reject the idea as unfair 
and even cruel to deer.  
The future of farming and conservation will likely depend on the evolution of the socio-
economic (and value) systems in which these practices take place, and whether ACI research 
can influence such evolution will likely depend on how ACI researchers choose to engage with 
those socio-economic systems. Uncomfortable as it might be for some, arguably it is important 
that ACI researchers are willing to engage with those systems, for that is the most direct way in 
which ACI can effect change in the real world. Broadly speaking, ACI researchers could effect 
change by developing animal-centred technology to improve the lives of individual animals 
whatever their situation, by exploring animal-centred research methodologies which enable 
animals to influence the design of the environments in which they find themselves, and by 
promoting through their research practices and outcomes an animal-centred ethics which could 
contribute to changing the way animals are regarded and related to in human society. To this 
effect, if they do choose to engage, it will arguably be more productive if ACI researchers 
engage constructively with the processes taking place within existing socio-economic systems 
as well as the ethical frameworks that regulate those systems’ functions. At the same time, it 
remains the responsibility of ACI researchers to operate within the boundaries of an animal-
welfare-centred ethics, both when designing technology and when designing research, and in 
general with regards to their attitude and behaviour towards the animals they work with.  
However, even if ACI research remained consistent with an animal-welfare-centred ethics, it 
could be argued that ACI research itself is just as ethically problematic as any other research 
involving animals on the grounds that, independently of the nature of any research practice, 
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animals cannot give informed consent to their involvement; thus involving them inevitably 
compromises their autonomy and reduces them to instruments within processes over which 
they have no real control. Although fundamental, this issue should not be abstracted from the 
contexts that already define the relationships between humans and other species. Animals do 
not necessarily consent to those relationships (e.g., cows to being farmed, dogs to assisting, 
horses to racing), thus it could be argued that their autonomy within those relationships is 
already compromised. But, it is precisely within the contextual (and ethical) limitations of such 
human-animal relationships that ACI research situates itself, providing opportunities for the 
expression and fulfilment of animals’ autonomy as a starting point for designing technology 
that can better support their activities, improve their lives, increase our understanding of them 
and raise their standing in human society. Providing animals with technology that enables them 
to better control the functions in which they are already involved affords them the possibility to 
exert a measure of autonomy, albeit within contextual limitations. As their autonomy is 
progressively supported by animal-centred technology, cultural and ethical assumptions might 
be questioned, and a space might be pushed open where animals are enabled to more 
significantly participate in co-designing shared environments with humans [27]. In order for 
technology to be animal-centred, though, animals need to be part of the research processes that 
lead to the development of such technology. Giving animals the opportunity to participate in, 
and thus inform, the processes in which they have a stake is one way of empowering them, 
albeit limitedly. Involving animals as participants in processes in which they have a stake is not 
the same as using animals as instruments in processes in which they have no stake. Arguably, 
whether autonomy is denied or promoted, whether animals are used or users, subjects or 
participants, is not necessarily a choice researchers make by either involving animals in 
research or leaving them out of it. Rather it is a choice researchers make within the context of 
specific research practices, throughout concrete research processes, in the way they regard and 
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relate to the animals they work with, from the moment they set their research goals to the 
moment they write their final research reports [50]. 
10. Conclusions 
Our interactions with the increasingly technologized environments we inhabit have over time 
been enabled by ever thickening layers of technological complexity. For many decades we 
have been driving cars, most of us without knowing how engines work; more recently we have 
learnt to move and socialise within the virtual realities which exist in our computers, most of us 
blissfully oblivious to the stratifications of code powering these machines; as we go about our 
daily business, our spontaneous gestures and movements within cybertectural spaces trigger all 
kinds of environmental changes without us even realising; our activity patterns are recorded by 
the many ubiquitous computing devices we interact with during most of our day, and our data 
put to uses we are not aware of. With the inner workings of everyday technology obscured 
behind seamless interfaces, our ability to make sense of what technology does beneath the 
surface of our immediate experience can be severely limited; and so can our understanding of 
the implications of our increasingly implicit technologically-mediated interactions [21]. In this 
respect, the position of a dog who interacts with a computing interface with a limited 
understanding of the situation beyond ‘their own here and now’ is not dissimilar to that of a 
human seamlessly interacting with much contemporary computing technology. Indeed, with all 
its complexities, technology is beginning to blur the boundaries between human and animal 
agency, just as it is blurring the boundaries between users and interactors [30]. Within this 
landscape, ACI has the potential to significantly contribute to the re-assessment of 
anthropocentric interpretations of concepts such as ‘use’ and ‘participation’, both in interaction 
design as a discipline and in the design of future smart environments.  
So far the design of technological interactions has taken place in a socio-economic 
anthropocentric space, and has been driven by anthropocentric agendas [27]. But this does not 
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mean that, afforded adequate access, animals would not be able to join the design table. Unlike 
human researchers, animal participants may not be able to comprehend the wider implications 
of the research processes they are involved in; and they may not share with designers the same 
understanding of the technological interactions they are exposed to. Nevertheless, animals are 
able to interact with and make sense of their immediate surroundings, at least in relation to the 
needs and wants evolution has endowed them with, and whatever they have learnt to do in 
order to fulfil those. If ACI is to afford animals the role of design contributors, it is essential 
that ACI researchers enable animals’ needs and wants to emerge during the design process, and 
prioritise them over other extrinsic interests. As we have seen, existing regulatory frameworks 
for the involvement of animals in research essentially regard them as instruments in an 
experimental apparatus, while recognising their need for protection on the grounds of their 
inability to consent to their involvement and the potential harm that can ensue. In these 
frameworks such protection depends on criteria that don’t necessarily reflect the needs and 
wants of the individuals involved and that ultimately prioritise other interests. Such 
anthropocentric ethical perspective may be appropriate for human-centred research, but if ACI 
is to truly lead to animal-centred research, its ethical perspective needs to go beyond existing 
regulatory frameworks and guidelines. ACI needs an animal-centred ethics that can foster a 
culture of respect and sensitivity towards the requirements of animal research participants 
within the research community; an ethics that can inform the appropriate methodological 
conditions for enabling animals to express their requirements, thus allowing their requirements 
to shape the design process and mould the building blocks of a multispecies society.  
PART 2 
Ethical principles for Animal-Centred Research 
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In ACI’s animal-centred research the interests of ‘nonhuman animal’ (hereafter ‘animal’) 
participants (as those of human participants where applicable) should always prevail over those 
of science and society, where there is conflict [9]. At all times researchers and research 
procedures should protect the welfare (health, wants and life), and respect the autonomy and 
dignity of animal (and human) participants. This fundamental perspective can be articulated 
through the following principles. 
1. Respecting and caring for every participant without discrimination 
 Researchers should acknowledge and respect the individual characteristics of every animal 
participating in the research regardless of categorisation such as species, sex or provenance; 
and they should treat all research participants (humans or animals) as individuals equally 
deserving of consideration and care according to their welfare requirements.  
2. Garnering participants’ mediated and contingent consent 
 Researchers should obtain free and voluntary informed consent to the involvement of animal 
(as well as human) participants in research activities from those who are legally responsible 
for them and involved in their day to day care (as is the case with non-competent children; 
when doing research with competent adults and children, consent should be obtained from 
the participants themselves). For companion animals these might be their human 
companions; for animals living in shelters and zoos these might be the facilities’ managers 
and the individuals’ carers. Obtaining this form of mediated consent should be seen as a 
continuing process, not just as a one-off occurrence [8,9], and legal guardians should always 
be informed that they can withdraw participants from the research at any time without 
needing to provide an explanation. 
 Researchers should garner the voluntary consent of the animals to their involvement in 
research activities and obtaining this form of contingent consent should be seen as a 
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continuing process, not just as a one-off occurrence [8,9]. To this end, research set-ups 
should be designed to facilitate participants’ assessment of their immediate situation 
throughout procedures. Procedural conditions should always, and without exception, afford 
animal (and human) participants the possibility to choose whether to engage with the 
research, as well as the possibility to withdraw at any time, either temporarily or 
permanently, from the research. If participants (animals or non-competent children) become 
uncooperative, or present signs of stress or distress, researchers should regard this as a 
refusal to take part in a procedure [9]. Researchers might make reasonable attempts to entice 
the participants to engage with the procedure again at a later stage, but should immediately 
desist if the participants’ negative response persists.  
3. Doing research that is relevant to participants and consistent with their welfare 
 Individual animals (as well as vulnerable humans such as very young children) should be 
involved in research practices only when these have the potential to generate scientific 
understanding that may be a basis for improvements in the development of animal-centred 
technology that is relevant to them. More specifically, ACI researchers should only work 
with animals of a particular group (e.g. species) if the intent is to advance knowledge or 
develop technology that is directly or indirectly beneficial to the individuals involved in the 
research as well as other individuals of that group.  
 Research procedures that involve the participation of free-living animals should take place in 
the animals’ natural habitat, while those that involve domesticated animals (e.g., companion 
animals and animals living in farms or zoos) should take place in the animals’ familiar 
settings or, if necessary, in appropriate research facilities, provided that this did not impact 
negatively on their welfare. Animals should not, under any circumstances, be bred or taken 
from the wild, and kept in captivity (permanently or temporarily) for the sole purpose of 
involving them in ACI research activities. 
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 Whenever possible, researchers should endeavour to design research procedures that can be 
carried out in the participants’ habitual environments and blend in with their living 
conditions. Researchers working with free-living animals in their natural habitats should 
seek to minimise interference with individuals as well as the populations and eco-systems of 
which the individuals are a part. Researchers working with domesticated animals should 
ensure that their presence and interference is not unwelcome to the individuals involved and 
any environmental disturbance is kept to a minimum.  
 Where it was not appropriate for research activities to be conducted in naturalistic settings 
and these needed to be conducted within specific research facilities or scientific venues, 
animals (as well as children) should be accompanied by their legal guardians or legally 
delegated carers, provided that this did not affect the welfare of the participants or 
compromise public safety. For the duration of the activities, animals should remain under the 
supervision of their legal guardians or legally delegated carers or researchers, who should 
supervise both the interaction of research staff or the public with the animals, and the 
interaction of the animals with research staff or the public (e.g., a guardian, whose dog was 
visiting an ACI lab to test a prototype or an ACI venue to demonstrate it, should be able to 
ensure that researchers or members of the public did not interact with the dog in ways that 
might cause the dog stress, and that the dog did not behave aggressively). Throughout these 
interactions, animal welfare and public safety (including the safety of the animals involved) 
should be the uttermost priority. 
 Where visits of non-resident animals were required, research facilities and scientific venues 
should provide safe and comfortable accommodation, including an appropriate location for 
retreat and appropriate dietary provisions. Animals should only spend the night within 
research facilities or scientific venues under the following circumstances: 1) if the animals 
were already housed at the facilities or venues for other purposes (e.g., mice who already 
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live in research laboratories to be involved in other research procedures); 2) if the facilities 
or venues allowed the animals’ legal guardians or delegated carers or researchers to spend 
the night with them, and staying overnight did not negatively affect the welfare of the 
animals (e.g., an ambient technology installation that could offer comfortable 
accommodation to both a dog and their human). 
4. Avoiding research procedures that may be harmful to participants 
 ACI practices should ensure an acceptable balance of risk and benefit for animal (as well as 
human) participants and researchers should protect participants from physiological and 
psychological harm at all times by employing research methods that are non-invasive, non-
oppressive, non-restrictive and non-depriving. The anticipated risks to participants should be 
negligible, that is resulting at worst in no more than a slight and temporary negative impact 
(e.g., if a dog tested an interface which momentarily frustrated them through unintentional 
excessive complication in the design). Under no circumstances should the welfare standards 
afforded by ACI practices ever fall below the welfare standards envisaged by frameworks 
such as the British Animal Welfare Act 2006 [6], or equivalent frameworks in other 
countries.  
 ACI research practices should never have the potential effect of causing animal participants 
pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm [5]. Pain, suffering, distress and lasting harm 
encompass any material disturbance to normal health (defined as the physiological and 
psychological and social well-being of the animal) [5]. This also includes disease, injury, 
and physiological or psychological discomfort, whether immediately (such as at the time of 
an injection), or in the longer term (such as the consequences of the application of a 
carcinogen) [5]. In other words, ACI practices should never be such that they require 
regulation under frameworks such as the British Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 
and Amendment Regulations 2012 [5], or equivalent frameworks in other countries.  
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 ACI research practices conducted in the wild should never involve the intentional killing, 
injuring or taking of animals, as well as the possession or control of live or dead animals, 
their parts or derivatives (including selling, offering for sale, or possessing or transporting 
for the purpose of selling them) [7]. This also includes damage to, destruction of, or 
obstruction of access to any structure or place used by animals for shelter or protection, or 
even simply disturbance of animals occupying such structure or place [7]. In other words, 
ACI practices should never be such that they require regulation under frameworks such as 
the British Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 [7] or equivalent frameworks in other 
countries. 
 ACI researchers might need to combine their own research practices with procedures that 
imply a higher level of risk for individual participants, in order to develop technology that 
can ultimately benefit them. However, this should only be the case under either of the 
following conditions: 1) if such higher risk procedures were necessary for the welfare of 
individual participants (e.g., the ACI researcher might incorporate an ACI procedure into an 
animal’s visit to a veterinary practice for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes); 2) if such 
higher risk procedures were already part of individual participants’ daily life and habitual 
experience (e.g., the ACI researcher might analyse the functionalities of a conditioning 
chamber habitually used by a group of mice in behavioural studies for the purpose of 
suggesting improvements to the usability of the device). In either case, such higher risk 
procedures should never be carried out by ACI researchers. 
 Researchers should always take into account the cumulative effects of research procedures, 
possibly associated with other procedures (e.g. husbandry), on individual participants. They 
should ensure that such cumulative effects do not cause the research procedures to impact on 
the participants to the extent that welfare standards fall below those envisaged by 
frameworks such as the British Animal Welfare Act 2006 [6], or equivalent frameworks in 
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other countries; or cause unregulated procedures (e.g., a visit to the vet) to require regulation 
under frameworks such as the British Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 and 
Amendment Regulations 2012 [5], or Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 [6], or equivalent 
frameworks in other countries.  
 Under no circumstances should the animals recruited to take part in ACI research ever be 
used in scientific procedures that do not fully comply with the ethical principles of animal-
centred research.  
5. Assessing research proposals and obtaining expert support 
 A competent, independent scientific and ethical review body should assess and approve any 
research proposal before an ACI research project or activity commences, in order to ensure 
that the research design appropriately meets both scientific and ethical standards. 
 The competent scientific and ethical review body assessing the research proposal should 
ensure that the research team has direct access to the appropriate animal welfare expertise so 
that any welfare issues that might emerge during the research are promptly recognised and 
properly addressed. Whenever deemed necessary by the ethical review body assessing the 
research proposal, ACI researchers should receive appropriate training before undertaking 
the research envisaged by the proposal under review.  
 If, during the research, researchers become concerned for the safety and welfare of a 
participant (animal or human), they should promptly seek advice from the competent ethical 
and scientific review body within their research institution as to how the case should be dealt 
with and whether it should be reported to the relevant authorities. 
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